The Socio-Economic Rights and Accountability Project (SERAP) has taken the government of Bola Tinubu before the ECOWAS Community Court of Justice over what it described as the government’s “the failure to withdraw the patently unlawful mass phone-tapping rules known as ‘Lawful Interception of Communications Regulations, 2019.’”
The legal action followed allegations by former Kaduna State governor Nasir El-Rufai, who claimed that a phone conversation involving the National Security Adviser, Nuhu Ribadu, was intercepted. El-Rufai reportedly stated, “The NSA’s call was tapped. They do that to our calls too, and we heard him saying they should arrest me.”
In the suit marked ECW/CCJ/APP/11/26 and filed last Friday at the ECOWAS court in Abuja, SERAP is seeking “a declaration that the failure of the government to withdraw the Interception of Communications Regulations is unlawful and a violation of Nigeria’s international human rights obligations.”
The organisation is also asking the court for “a declaration that the failure of the government to withdraw the Interception of Communications Regulations constitutes an official endorsement of unlawful mass phone-tapping rules, as the Regulations are patently unlawful, and violate the rule of law, democratic principles, and the right to privacy.”
SERAP further requested “an order directing and compelling the Nigerian government to immediately withdraw the Interception of Communications Regulations, and to commence a legislative process to ensure that any interception regulations are in conformity with Nigeria’s international human rights obligations.”
In its argument before the court, SERAP stated that “the Regulations establish a sweeping mass phone-tapping regime that violates Nigerians’ constitutionally and internationally guaranteed human rights including to privacy and freedom of expression.”
The organisation also argued that “Where powers affecting fundamental human rights are exercised in secrecy and concentrated in political authorities without independent supervision, the risks of arbitrariness are substantial.”
According to SERAP, “Surveillance measures that lack strict necessity, proportionality and independent judicial oversight can easily be weaponised against political opponents, journalists, civil society actors and election observers.”
It added that “The Regulations also raise serious concerns as Nigeria approaches the 2027 general elections. Broad and weakly safeguarded interception powers create a real risk of abuse during politically sensitive periods.”
The suit, filed on behalf of SERAP by its lawyers Kolawole Oluwadare, Oluwakemi Oni, Valentina Adegoke and Maryam Mumuni, partly read: “Secret surveillance and bulk data collection create a permanent risk of misuse, profiling and abuse, particularly given the formidable technologies available to state authorities.”
“The mere retention or storage of personal data relating to an individual’s private life constitutes an interference with this right—whether or not the data is subsequently accessed or used.”
SERAP further warned that “In an electoral climate, even the perception that private communications are being monitored can chill political organising, investigative reporting and voter mobilisation.”
The organisation maintained that “The Regulations grant overly broad and vague powers to intercept communications on grounds such as ‘national security,’ ‘economic wellbeing,’ and ‘public emergency,’ without adequate judicial safeguards, independent oversight, transparency, or effective remedies.”
It also argued that “Free and fair elections depend on confidential communications, protected journalistic sources and open democratic debate. Any misuse of intercepted data for intimidation, political advantage or disinformation would fundamentally undermine Nigerians’ right to political participation and electoral integrity.”
SERAP added that “As 2027 approaches, interception powers must be narrowly defined, subject to prior independent judicial authorisation and backed by effective remedies. Without robust safeguards, these Regulations risk threatening privacy rights, freedom of expression and the credibility of Nigeria’s democratic process.”
The group stressed that “Any restriction on the right to privacy must strictly comply with the principles of legality, necessity and proportionality. The Regulations fail all three tests.”
According to SERAP, “The Regulations normalise surveillance as routine state practice and invert the presumption of privacy by criminalising interception except as permitted under the Regulations.”
Citing global standards, SERAP noted that “The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights has made it unequivocally clear: mass surveillance programmes based on indiscriminate and blanket collection of personal data are arbitrary per se and can never satisfy the requirements of legality, necessity, and proportionality.”
The organisation further stated that “The Nigerian government has a positive obligation to adopt clear laws, effective safeguards, independent oversight mechanisms and accessible remedies to prevent abuse. These duties extend not only to state agencies but also to private actors, including telecommunications providers and technology companies.”
SERAP explained that “The Nigerian Communications Commission (the Commission) while purportedly exercising its powers under section 70 of the Nigerian Communications Act, 2003 adopted the ‘Lawful Interception of Communications Regulations, 2019 (The Regulations).’”
It added that “Under Regulation 4, broad discretionary interception powers are granted to the National Security Adviser and the State Security Services, with minimal clarity regarding the scope or limits of such discretion.”
The organisation warned that “The provision also extends to communications within and outside Nigeria and grants blanket immunity to licensees acting ‘in good faith.’ Such broad and vaguely defined powers create significant risks of abuse, including political misuse.”
SERAP pointed out that “The inconsistencies in the Regulations create serious legal concerns. Regulation 4(1) limits interception powers to the National Security Adviser (NSA) and the State Security Services (SSS), and Regulation 12(1) reiterates this restriction.”
“However, Regulation 23 on ‘Interpretation’ expands the category of ‘authorised agencies’ to include additional bodies such as the Nigeria Police Force, National Intelligence Agency, Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, National Drug Law Enforcement Agency, and any other agency the Commission may designate.”
The group argued that “This creates ambiguity and undermines legal certainty. Nigerians cannot reasonably know which authorities are empowered to intercept their communications, making the Regulations unpredictable and prone to arbitrary application and abuse.”
It added that “By delegating authority to the Commission to expand the list at its discretion, Regulation 23 effectively grants unfettered administrative power, contrary to constitutional guarantees of privacy under Section 37 of the Nigerian Constitution and Nigeria’s binding international human rights obligations.”
SERAP warned that “Such regulatory ambiguity threatens the rule of law, weakens accountability mechanisms, and increases the risk of abuse, particularly in politically sensitive contexts or during elections. Clear, narrowly defined statutory limits are essential wherever state authorities are empowered to intrude upon private communications.”
The organisation further criticised Regulation 8, saying “Regulation 8 is particularly troubling, as it permits interception without a warrant in situations involving consent, threats to life, or actions in the ‘ordinary course of business.’ These grounds are overly broad and clearly susceptible to abuse.”
It added that “Even where warrants are required, applications are made ex parte and without adversarial safeguards. Grounds such as ‘national security’ and ‘economic wellbeing’ are insufficiently defined, undermining the principles of legality and foreseeability.”
SERAP also argued that “The Regulations also fail to require notification of individuals who have been subjected to surveillance, either during or after interception. Without notification, the ability of individuals to challenge unlawful surveillance is severely undermined.”
The group stressed that “Private communications form part of individuals’ intimate sphere and personal development. In the digital age, protecting these rights requires exceptional vigilance.”
According to SERAP, “The Regulations supposedly establish under Regulation 2 a ‘legal and regulatory framework for the lawful interception of communications in Nigeria.’”
It also noted that “Under Regulation 6, intercepted communications may be retained for the duration of an investigation and archived for up to three years. There is no clarity on conditions governing storage, destruction, and oversight of retained data.”
SERAP further criticised Regulation 9, stating that “Regulation 9 compels disclosure of encryption keys and access mechanisms by licensees and private persons. This provision weakens cybersecurity for everyone and fails to provide safeguards for journalists, lawyers, and human rights defenders whose communications require heightened protection.”
It also pointed out that “Regulations 10 and 11 require licensees to install interception equipment and prohibit services without interception capacity. These provisions effectively discourage privacy-enhancing technologies and undermine secure communications, thereby chilling freedom of privacy, expression and association.”
The organisation raised concerns that “Emergency interception powers under Regulation 12 allow warrantless surveillance on broad grounds, including ‘national security’ and ‘organised crime’, without prior judicial authorisation. Vague national security grounds violate the right to privacy.”
SERAP added that “Regulations 13 to 15 grant extensive powers of entry, seizure, and execution without establishing an independent review mechanism. Likewise, Regulation 19 limits reporting to the Attorney General of the Federation, a political appointee, without independent parliamentary or judicial oversight.”
While acknowledging security concerns, the group concluded that “While SERAP acknowledges the government’s responsibility to address national security and organised crime, such objectives must be pursued within constitutional and international human rights limits. The Regulations are neither necessary in a democratic society nor proportionate.”
No date has yet been fixed for the hearing of the case.